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Abstract: 
 
Recent literature has argued that nonviolent political resistance campaigns are more 
effective at achieving their political goals than violent resistance campaigns. This paper 
examines the effect that campaign setting (urban or rural) has upon campaign type (violent or 
nonviolent), and campaign success. I argue that nonviolent movements tend to form in urban 
areas critical to the regime, while violent movements tend to arise in non-threatening rural 
hinterlands. Urbanness benefits campaigns in multiple ways, including allowing for greater 
mobilization, increasing the chances of defections by elites and security forces, and by providing 
high value targets for disruption. However, violent campaigns are often unable to capitalize 
upon these benefits because regimes prevent them from mobilizing in urban areas. I support this 
theory with quantitative evidence by linking observations from two event-level datasets on 
conflict to a dataset on maximalist resistance campaigns. I find that correlations between 
nonviolence and success may instead be due to a relationship between campaign setting and 
success. I complement the quantitative analysis with case studies of Iranian resistance 
campaigns since 1890. The results challenge the notion that nonviolent resistance can be a 
strategic substitute for violent resistance. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
As the Arab Spring swept through the Middle East, it renewed interest in nonviolence as 
a strategic form of resistance. Onlookers praised the “newfound conviction that protests, strikes, 
and civil action are more effective than fighting and force” (Slackman and El-Naggar 2011). As 
dissidents waged nonviolent resistance, many drew strategies and inspiration from nonviolent 
research (Roberts 2018). Scholars of nonviolence led nonviolence “workshops” for 
revolutionaries in Egypt and elsewhere (Giovanni 2012). Advocates of nonviolent resistance 
praise its use not only on moral grounds, but argue that it is more effective than violent resistance 
at achieving political goals (Sharp 1973, Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). If incorrect, nonviolent 
proponents may be leading their followers down a dangerous path. 
 
The practice of nonviolence has an ancient history. Gene Sharp, a pioneer in research on 
nonviolent resistance, argued in his 1973 treatise, The Politics of Nonviolent Action,that there is 
evidence “of plebeian protests against Rome as far back as the fifth century B.C.”, and of 
peaceful “resistance of the Netherlands to Spanish rule in mid-sixteenth century Europe” (Sharp 
1973, 4). Centuries ago, nonviolent resistance campaigns may have been rare, but in the past few 
decades, nonviolent resistance campaigns have become increasingly common (Chenoweth and 
Stephan 2011, 7; Tilly 1978, 159). 
 
Yet the study of nonviolence is in its infancy. Sharp, inspired by the success of Mahatma 
Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr., was a foremost promoter of nonviolent resistance, even 
publishing handbooks of resistance tactics. In recent years, Erica Chenoweth, Peter Ackerman, 
Stephen Zunes, Kurt Schock, and Sharon Nepstad have also made contributions to the study of 
nonviolence. Still, major gaps in the literature on nonviolence persist. The majority of research 
relies on case studies rather than quantitative data (Karakaya 2016, 1). Thus far the nonviolent 
literature has “overwhelmingly focused on urban-based pro-democracy movements” (Schock 
2015, 171). To my knowledge, no maximalist nonviolent campaign has succeeded while 
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remaining rural-based.1 Finally, “there is no commonly accepted theory” about what 
factors cause a resistance to be violent or nonviolent (Karakaya 2016, 1). 
 
Perhaps the most impressive empirical research on nonviolence is Chenoweth and 
Stephan’s 2011 book Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. 
To support their argument, the authors compile an original dataset on Nonviolent and Violent 
Campaign Outcomes (NAVCO), which includes information on hundreds of campaigns around 
the world between 1900 and 2006. Chenoweth and Stephan argue that maximalist2 nonviolent 
campaigns “were nearly twice as likely to achieve full or partial success as their violent 
counterparts were” over that time period (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 7). Little other 
quantitative research has simultaneously analyzed violent and nonviolent resistance (such 
research is limited to Karakaya 2016; Dahl et al. 2014, Butcher and Svensson 2014; Chenoweth 
and Lewis 2013; and Regan and Norton 2005). The structural factors that lead actors to choose 
violent or nonviolent strategies remain largely unexplored. This is problematic: if campaigns 
organizers are constrained by structural factors in the tactics that they can employ, strategic 
substitution of nonviolent tactics for violent tactics may not be feasible. 
 
My central argument is that campaign setting (urban or rural) affects both campaign type 
(violent or nonviolent) and campaign success. I demonstrate that nonviolent movements tend to 
form in urban areas critical to the regime, while violent movements tend to arise in non-
threatening rural hinterlands. When campaign setting is taken into account, campaign type loses 
much of its effect on success. 
 
I support this theory with quantitative and qualitative evidence. I conduct quantitative 
analysis by linking two event-level geocoded datasets to an updated version of the NAVCO 
dataset, NAVCO 2. Linking the event-level datasets to NAVCO 2 allows for coding of campaign 
setting. I support the quantitative analysis with study of Iranian revolutions since 1890, focusing 
on the Islamic Revolution of 1977-79. 
 
Recent trends in urbanization and population growth underscore the importance of this 
investigation. Since 1960, the world’s population has more than doubled from just over three 
billion to nearly seven and a half billion people. Today, more than half of the world’s population 
lives in cities (World Bank Data 2017). The U.N. projects that in the coming decades, urban 
population growth will exceed world population growth, as rural populations migrate to urban 
areas (The United Nations 2015). Moreover, the developing world is expected to absorb more 
than 90% of the world’s urban population growth (The United Nations 2015). As urban centers 
in developing countries become more numerous and more populous, urban conflict, both violent 
and nonviolent, will become more common (Kilcullen 2013). 
 
This paper proceeds as follows: the next section analyzes existing literature on nonviolent 
and violent campaigns, with a focus on the relationship between campaign type, campaign goals, and 
campaign setting. In the third section, I present my argument. Fourth and fifth, I introduce and 
analyze the quantitative evidence supporting my theory. I compliment this quantitative  
 
1 Schock (2015) argues that successful rural nonviolent campaigns must adopt modest goals, and thus are rarely, 
if ever, maximalist. 
2 “Maximalist” campaigns refer to those that have a “major and disruptive political objective, such as the ending of 
a current political regime, a foreign occupation, or secession” (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). 
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evidence in the sixth section with case studies of Iranian revolutions since 1890. A 
seventh section concludes. 
 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
In this section, I first outline a model of strategic bargaining between regimes and 
opposition movements. I then discuss the different coercion methods of violent and nonviolent 
campaigns and consider when campaigns leaders will choose violent or nonviolent tactics. I then 
discuss the prevailing theories on why nonviolence might be more effective than violence. 
Finally, I examine literature that ties urban areas to nonviolence and to campaign success. For 
much of this section, I draw heavily from Dahl et al. (henceforth simply Dahl) (2014), thus far 
the only authors to argue for a relationship between campaign setting, type, and success. 
 
 
A Bargaining Model 
 
Following Fearon (1995, 387) and Dahl (2014, 7), I use a zero-sum model of bargaining 
over policy between a regime r and a dissident campaign d to illustrate when conflict might 
occur (Figure 1.1). Each party has preferences over the interval [0,1], where the regimeprefers a 
policy outcome closer to 0, and the campaign prefers an outcome closer to 1. The relative power 
pof campaign and regime increases increases with the costs cthat the opposition can impose 
r  
upon the regime, and decreases with the costs cthat the regime can impose upon the dissidents. 
d  
If the policy status quo q is less than p,and if policy change through conventional means is 
unavailable,3 the dissidents have an incentive to initiate a campaign opposing the regime, 
forcing a shift in policy to position x.4  
In this model, p is solely a function of the relative costs that each actor can impose upon 
the other. In the following sections, I consider why campaign organizers would choose violent or 
nonviolent tactics to maximize the relative costs imposed upon the regime. Following Dahl 
(2014) I argue that because violent and nonviolent campaigns impose costs through different 
mechanisms, nonviolent campaigns have a comparative advantage with large numbers of 
participants, while violent campaigns have a comparative advantage with fewer participants.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Policy change through state sanctioned means might be possible in a democracy through voting, for 
instance. Affecting policy change in autocracies through state sanctioned means is likely to be more difficult. 
4 This model differs from the ones used by Fearon (1995, 387) and Dahl (2014, 7), though it closely approximates both. 
Fearon (1995) used the model to why inter-state war occurs despite the costs it imposes on participants. Dahl uses the 
model to explain why opposition groups might initiate campaigns against regimes. Like Dahl I use p to represent the 
relative power balance between regime and opposition. Unlike Dahl, I consider relative power to be a 
function of the costs that each actor can impose upon the other, such that p increases with greater cand decreases 
d 
with greater c. Considering costs to be separate from pis useful when questioning if conflict between states is likely 
r 
to occur, as in Fearon (1995). It is unclear in Dahl’s model what p represents if not the relative costs that each 
actor can impose upon the other. 
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Figure 1.1: A Bargaining Model  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coercion Models of Violent and Nonviolent Campaigns 
 
Violent and nonviolent campaigns coerce regimes in different ways. Dahl posits that 
violent campaigns succeed either through complete military victory over the regime, or by 
making the threat of “violent conflict sufficiently costly that the government will provide some 
accommodation or settlement” (Dahl 2014, 8). Violent campaigns do not need to “mobilize and 
exercise a force more powerful than the projected force of the government” to succeed, as some 
authors have argued (Buhaug 2010, 109). This would be necessary for a complete military 
victory, but is not required for guerrilla groups or terrorists, who operate by covert action and 
often succeed through attrition (Nepstad 2011b, 8). The military power of the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA), for instance, never rivalled that of the English army, but the IRA still managed to 
sustain its resistance (Staniland 2010). 
 
By killing people and destroying infrastructure, violent campaigns impose direct costs 
upon the regime “in terms of the military response required, or [impose] indirect costs through 
the economic ramifications or ability for the government to maintain support” (Dahl 2014, 8-
9). The capacity of a campaign to kill and destroy increases with the number of soldiers the 
campaign can mobilize. Thus, Dahl argues that the number of soldiers in a campaign is a 
reasonable proxy for cv(following Dahl, I use superscripts of v and n to denote violence or 
r  
nonviolence) (Dahl 2014, 10; Butler and Gates 2009, 4). 
 
Nonviolent campaigns coerce regimes by “separating governments from their means of 
control” (Ackerman and DuVall 2000, 7). This can take the form of reducing the flow of rents to 
the regime, or by making it difficult for the government to implement policies (Dahl 2014, 8). 
While violent campaigns are relatively limited in the tactics available to them, Sharp (1973) 
identifies 198 different tactics that nonviolent campaigns can employ. These range from 
“humorous skits and pranks” to “generalized strikes”. Similar to violent campaigns, the capacity 
of a nonviolent campaign to impose costs upon the regime increases with campaign participation 
(Dahl 2014, 9). 
 
Thus, for a simplistic model, Dahl assumes that both violent and nonviolent campaigns 
impose costs upon regimes “with only one input, namely the number of active participants” 
(Dahl 2014, 9-10). In the following section, I share this assumption and expand upon the 
relationship between mobilization level m and relative power of the campaign p,and then 
consider how campaigns can maximize m through use of nonviolent tactics.Later, I consider the 
effects of additional inputs available in urban campaigns. 
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Mobilization and Campaign Success 
 
Dahl posits that a campaign is feasible if it can “sustain confrontation” with the regime 
(Dahl 2014, 10). Violent campaigns plausibly require a lower mto be feasible than nonviolent 
campaigns (Dahl 2014, 10). Small guerrilla groups can commit assassinations and bombings 
while evading state armies or police, thus inflicting non-trivial cupon the regime even with low 
r   
m(Arreguin-Toft 2001; Dahl 2014, 10). However, violent campaigns do not easily scale. In many cases, cvmay actually increase with m,as 
guerrilla groups become more susceptible to 
d 
infiltration, or as insurgents find it more difficult to escape military forces (Dahl 2014, 13). For 
instance, as I further discuss in a case study of Iranian Revolutions below, guerrillas in Iran in 
the 1970s were able to consistently harass the regime despite never numbering more than a few 
hundred. However, attempts to expand participation led to repeated infiltration by the secret 
police apparatus. Thus, pvdoes not become substantially greater with increasing m.  
Nonviolent campaigns are more likely to require high mto be successful, but can become 
highly effective if able to reach mass mobilization. Nearly all of the 198 nonviolent tactics that 
Sharp (1973) outlines need popular participation for success. Consider how without broad 
support, generalized strikes, marches, and withdrawal of bank deposits quickly lose their effect. 
While these tactics can be devastating if properly employed, they plausibly require some critical 
mass of mobilization below which they are ineffective. Moreover, cnrapidly decreases with 
d 
increasing m,as regimes are unable to target each participant in a mass protest. For instance, 
during the climax of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, the regime was powerless to punish 
demonstrators, as “there were literally too many protesters to arrest” (Kurzman 2004, 111). Thus, 
pngrows quickly with m (Dahl 2014, 11-13).  
In sum, violent campaigns are feasible with low m,but do not scale effectively, while 
nonviolent campaigns are not threatening with low m but become dangerous to the regime when m is 
high. I model this dynamic in Figure 1.2, drawn from Dahl (2014, 12).5 As Dahl writes, the figure 
demonstrates that below a certain m,violence is the preferred resistance tactic. Above that level, 
nonviolence becomes more effective than violence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 Figure 1.2 is essentially identical to Figure 2 from Dahl (2014, 12). However, I scale p to increase with dissident 
power instead of with regime power. 
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Figure 1.2: Relative Power and Mobilization by Type  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Existing Argument in Support of Strategic Nonviolence 
 
Thus far, I have taken m as fixed. Here I consider the factors that affect campaign 
mobilization. Chenoweth and Stephan argue that one of the main advantages that nonviolent 
resistance has over violent resistance is its ability to increase mobilization (Chenoweth and 
Stephan 2011, 30). The authors attribute this advantage to “physical, informational, commitment, 
and moral considerations” (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 30). Participation in violent 
campaigns “may require physical skills such as agility and endurance, willingness to train, ability 
to handle and use weapons, and often isolation from society at large” (Chenoweth and Stephan 
2011, 35). Nonviolent resistance does not necessarily require any of these traits. Indeed, as many 
nonviolent tactics involve acts of omission, “whereby people refuse to perform acts expected by 
norms, custom, law, or decree”, participation is potentially open to all (Schock 2003, 705). 
Violent campaigns may have difficulty publicizing information about the campaigns, as they 
often rely on covert tactics. Nonviolent tactics do not rely as much upon covert action, and thus 
can more freely advertise their cause to the public (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 36). 
Participation in violent campaigns may also requires greater commitment to the cause. New 
soldiers risk death and require extensive training, whereas anyone can join the ranks of a 
nonviolent protest. Often more covert than their nonviolent counterparts, violent campaigns must 
be more cautious about who they admit into their ranks, for fear of infiltration by the regime’s 
security forces. Moral considerations may limit participation in violent campaigns as not all 
campaign sympathizers are willing to kill for the cause (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 37). 
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Chenoweth and Stephan also argue that nonviolent campaigns are more successful than 
violent campaigns because they are more able to induce security force defections. Large 
nonviolent campaigns are especially effective at causing security force defections (Chenoweth 
and Stephan 2011, 48). Security force defections may be a critical component of nonviolent 
campaigns success, as they remove the regimes main source of coercive power. Chenoweth and 
Stephan (2008) find that “security force defections make nonviolent campaigns forty-six times 
more likely to succeed than nonviolent campaigns where defections do not occur” (Stephan and 
Chenoweth 2008, 22). Comparatively, for “violent campaigns...the effect of security force 
defections on campaign outcomes is insignificant” (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008, 22). 
 
Chenoweth and Stephan compellingly argue that nonviolent campaigns are more 
effective at mobilizing participants and inducing security force defections than violent 
campaigns. However, they do not consider the role that campaign setting plays into each of these 
mechanisms, or into the effectiveness of resistance campaigns in general. In the next section, I 
argue that urban bases allow violent and nonviolent campaigns to tap into the mechanisms that 
make them successful, thus allowing them to maximize c. 
r 
 
 
Urban Bases and Costs Imposed Upon the Regime 
 
Large capital cities have long been a threat to unpopular regimes. When campaigns can 
operate in proximity to the regime’s seat of power, they are an existential threat. Indeed, “[c]ities 
shape the destinies of states” (Tilly 1992, 51). Many major capitals were designed to allow the 
state to effectively put down potential riots or rebellions, including Washington D.C., Paris, and 
Beijing (Kilcullen 2013; Wallace 2013). Such cities have wide avenues which allowed the 
state’s cavalry freedom of movement, and made constructing blockades difficult. Large squares 
in city streets allowed for dominating artillery placement (Kilcullen 2013). Mechanisms that 
allow urban campaigns of both types to enjoy more success than rural campaigns include greater 
mobilization potential, the presence of high-value targets, and greater media attention. Urban 
nonviolent campaigns also may have a greater ability to induce defections than their rural 
counterparts. 
 
Urban campaigns can mobilize greater number of participants than rural campaigns. 
Large populations in cities may reduce the proportion of people that must be recruited to a 
campaign to make it effective (Wallace 2013, 635; Fox and Bell 2016, 57). Cities are also likely 
to have a greater percentage of people mobilize than rural areas. Population density and larger 
social networks reduce communication costs (Tilly 1978; Jenkins 1983, 540; Sewell 2001; 
Nedal et al. 2015, 3). The presence of symbolic sites and natural places to gather also 
encourages mobilization. A “densely built pedestrian city with urban squares or a college 
campus with quadrangles, plazas, and other clearly marked public gathering places provides 
ready-made spaces for political demonstrations and assures them an appropriate audience will 
witness them” (Sewell 2001, 61). Finally, higher rates of literacy and internet access in urban 
areas allow campaign organizers to better recruit participants through social and print media 
(Moomaw and Shatter 1996; Breuer et al. 2015). 
 
Urban campaigns are more able to disrupt high-value targets than rural campaigns.  
Targets might be individuals - such as political, military, and business leaders - or infrastructure. 
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Urban violent campaigns can assassinate the regime leader or key personnel. Urban nonviolent 
campaigns may succeed by “physically pushing the dictator out of office by storming the 
leadership compound”, or by obstructing leaders’ day-to-day functions (Wallace 2013, 635). 
Distant from the regime, rural campaigns cannot exert similar costs. Similarly, urban campaigns, 
violent or nonviolent, can halt the functioning of banks, government buildings, main roads, 
power plants, and major businesses. Rural campaigns do not have similar targets available.6 
While the impact that urban areas have on campaign target availability - and thus on campaign 
success - is discussed in literature on violent conflict (Calluzzo 2010, 21), such discussion is 
surprisingly absent from the literature on nonviolent conflict. 
 
Urban campaigns are more likely to receive media attention than rural campaigns. 
Kalyvas (2006) argues that media organizations and academics focus on urban areas because 
gaining information about conflict in rural areas is costly, as “[a]ccess to the countryside tends to 
be hard if not impossible” (Kalyvas 2006, 41). He continues, “[n]ot coincidentally, one of the 
most intensely studied conflicts is Northern Ireland: an English-speaking country with good 
hotels, very pleasant scenery, temperate climate, tasty local cuisine, and most important, not a 
high level of danger” (Kalyvas 2006, 42). Lack of media attention can make it more difficult for 
rural campaigns to attract participants or to receive foreign support, as would-be sympathizers 
may be unaware that the campaigns even exist. 
 
Urban nonviolent campaigns are more likely to induce defections among regime elites, 
security forces, and civil servants than rural nonviolent campaigns. In one study, urban protests 
were quantitatively shown to be more likely to lead to elite defection than rural protests (Johnson 
and Thyne 2016). The authors hypothesize that urban protests “ease coordination obstacles” 
among regime elites and signal that defection will be viewed as legitimate (Johnson and Thyne 
2016, 1). Urban campaigns may be more likely to lead to defections among security forces and 
civil servants due to proximity between protesters and potential defectors, though this has not 
been empirically shown. Using case studies of six nonviolent campaigns, Nepstad argues that 
one of the ways that nonviolent campaigns can encourage security force defections is by 
working directly with active or retired military leadership (Nepstad 2011b, 15). Plausibily, 
military leadership tend to reside in urban areas. Notably, each case Nepstad studies is urban. 
Thus there are several reasons that I expect cto be greater in urban areas than in rural 
r  
ones for both campaign types. In the next section, I consider how urbanness has different effects upon cv and cn. 
d d 
 
 
Urban Bases and Costs Imposed Upon the Campaign 
While both violent and nonviolent campaigns can maximize cwhen operating in cities, 
r  
regimes have usually been able to impose greater costs upon urban violent campaigns than upon  
 
 
 
6I note that this line of reasoning is in line with Abrahms (2006), who finds that terrorist groups “whose attacks 
on civilian targets outnumbered attacks on military targets systematically failed to achieve their policy 
objectives” (Abrahms 2006, 43). Plausibly, rural areas are more likely to contain fewer military targets, making it 
difficult for rural violent campaigns to effectively coerce regimes. 
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urban nonviolent campaigns. Due to large cvin urban areas, violent campaigns are more often 
d 
forced to operate in the nonthreatening rural periphery than nonviolent campaigns are. 
 
There is a widespread consensus that violent insurgencies tend to be rural based. 
Theorists and practitioners of war, such as Carl von Clausewitz, Mao Tse-tung, and Che Guevara 
wrote that rural bases are critical to violent campaign success. Mao argued that the only way for 
a violent revolution to succeed is to avoid direct confrontation with the state until the power of 
the revolutionary forces rivals that of the incumbent. City dwellers live where the state is 
strongest, and so Mao was convinced “that only the peasantry of China, and not the urban 
proletariat, could provide the base for the revolution that would transform his country” (Griffith 
1966, 5). Buhaug (2010) quantitatively supports Mao’s theory, showing that rebels strategically 
decide where to fight battles during civil war. He finds that when the regime is powerful, rebels 
will fight in the periphery of the country. It is only when rebel power matches that of the regime 
that fighting begins to occur near urban centers. 
 
Seminal works in the literature on civil war share this view. In their classic work, Fearon 
and Laitin (2003) define insurgency as “a technology of military conflict characterized by 
small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas” (Fearon and 
Laitin 2003, 75). In his widely cited book on The Logic of Violence in Civil War,Kalyvas (2006) 
states “that most civil conflicts are fought primarily in rural areas by predominantly peasant 
armies” (Kalyvas 2006, 38). 
 
I argue that the main reason regimes are able to impose greater costs upon urban violent 
campaigns than upon urban nonviolent campaigns is due to a lack of safe space for the 
opposition. Violent campaigns require space to house and train soldiers, and to store arms and 
equipment (Nedal 2016, 3). Additionally, violent campaigns may be susceptible to “anonymous 
denunciation” in urban areas more so than in rural areas, “giving the government an advantage in 
its counterinsurgent efforts” (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 80). 
 
In terms of the bargaining model, cv is likely to be greater than cnin urban areas, d r  
especially in the beginning of the campaign. In the next section, I synthesize the findings from 
the literature review. 
 
 
III. The Argument: Urban Primacy 
 
I advance an argument in three parts. First, nonviolent campaigns are more likely to 
occur in urban areas than rural areas, and violent campaigns are more likely to occur in rural 
areas than urban ones.  
Second, campaigns that occur in urban areas are more likely to succeed than 
campaigns that occur in rural areas, even when campaign type is controlled for.  
Third, when campaign setting is controlled for, the relationship between campaign type 
and campaign success disappears or lessens dramatically. The relationship between nonviolence 
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and success found by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) may be due to the relationship between 
nonviolence and urban bases.7 
 
 
Figure 1.3: A Graphic Portrayal of the Argument  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV. The Data 
 
In this section I introduce quantitative evidence supporting the theory that campaign 
setting can predict campaign type, and that campaign type is linked to campaign success. I 
first present the data that I use in my analysis. Second, I check the data for possible biases that 
may have resulted in systematic inclusion of certain types of campaigns. 
 
 
Introducing the Data 
 
Data on campaign success come from the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and 
Outcomes 2 (NAVCO 2) dataset. For an anti-government movement to be included in the  
 
7 This argument offers both theoretic and empirical contributions to the existing literature. While Dahl (2014) has 
identified a relationship between campaign setting and campaign type, she considers the effect that that setting has 
upon success only as an aside (Dahl 2014, 21-22). I argue that setting plays a major role in determining both 
campaign type and success. I also offer a novel way to measure campaign setting, while Dahl does not explain 
how she gains data on this variable. 
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dataset, that movement must involve “a series of coordinated, contentious collective actions 
with at least 1,000 participants”, and the movement must declare “maximalist” goals 
(Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). Such maximalist goals include “regime change, secession, or the 
removal of a foreign occupier” (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). 
 
The NAVCO 2 data uses campaign-year as the unit of analysis for all states from 
1945-2006. Each campaign-year is coded as either primarily violent or nonviolent. 
Chenoweth and Stephan do not code campaign-years as urban or rural. 
 
Data on the setting of each campaign is gained by matching NAVCO 2 campaigns to data 
from the Social, Political, and Economic Event Database (SPEED) (Nardulli and Slana 2013) 
and to the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) for Africa and Latin America (Salehyan et 
al 2012). Both datasets make use of event-level, geocoded data, which capture “human-initiated 
destabilizing events” (Nardulli et al 2014). 
 
SPEED includes more than 62,000 event-level data points from all countries 1946 to 
present. SPEED’s data come from historical records of the New York Times (5.3 million 
documents), the Wall Street Journal (1.4 million documents), the Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service (FBIS) and the Summary of the World Broadcasts (SWB). Data for the two “intelligence 
agency aggregation services” were compiled by agents who monitored thousands of news 
outlets, often translating them into English. Together, the records from the FBIS and SWB 
amount to more than 20 million documents. Curators, assisted by computer algorithms, 
continuously add to SPEED, scrubbing more than 900 news feeds for data each day. (Nardulli 
and Slana 2013). 
 
SCAD has a smaller scope than SPEED. Its geographic area is limited only to Africa and 
Latin America. Temporally it covers only 1990-2010. Still, its records include nearly 15,000 
social conflict events in Africa, and more than 5,000 events in Latin America. SCAD’s curators 
add events to the dataset by using the Lexis-Nexis Academic database to search through multiple 
news organizations’ records. To qualify as an individual event in SCAD, incidents must have the 
same “issues, actors, and targets”, and must have a “distinct, continuous series of actions over 
time” (Salehyan et al 2012, 506). 
 
 
Linking the Datasets 
 
I link individual events in SPEED and SCAD to campaigns in NAVCO 2 by actor name, 
country, and year. Because SPEED and SCAD base their information off many news 
organizations, they often refer to the same actor in inconsistent ways, or in ways that do not 
match campaign name in NAVCO 2. In some cases, campaigns are easy to link despite 
inconsistencies in naming conventions. For instance,“The Front for the Liberation of 
Mozambique” can easily be identified if referenced as “Liberation Front for Mozambique”. In 
other instances, establishing a link between campaigns and events is less clear cut. NAVCO 2 
contains data on the 1973-2006 “Palestinian Liberation” campaign, though SPEED has 
references to many different actors which may have been involved in the campaign by different 
names, including “Hamas”, “Palestinian Arabs”, and the “Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine”. Some NAVCO 2 campaigns are defined by their targets (e.g. “Anti-Arap Moi”, or 
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“Anti-Banda”), rather than by a title. For those campaigns, I use the target of events in 
SPEED and SCAD to link them to campaigns. 
 
SCAD and SPEED do not directly code for whether campaigns are urban or rural. I 
recode SCAD events as urban if they occur in a “capital city”, a “major urban area”, “multiple 
urban areas”, or “nationwide”. I code SCAD events as rural if they occur in a “rural” area, or 
“multiple rural areas”. SPEED identifies the location of events by coordinates. Following 
Johnson and Thyne (2016, 11), I recode SPEED events as urban if they occur within three 
miles of the country’s capital city. If location of an event is unknown or omitted in either 
dataset, the event is dropped from analysis.8 I construct a campaign setting variable by dividing 
the number of urban events linked to each campaign by the total number of events in each 
campaign. Thus, the campaign setting variable represents the percentage of events linked to a 
campaign that are urban. 
 
NAVCO 2 codes campaigns as employing either primarily violent or nonviolent methods. 
I construct a new non-binary variable on campaign violence using the event-level data. I code 
SCAD events as violent if they are listed as an “organized violent riot”, “spontaneous violent 
riot”, “anti-government violence”, or “extra-government violence”. I code SCAD events as 
nonviolent if they are listed as an “organized demonstration”, “spontaneous demonstration”, 
“general strike”, or “limited strike”. For SCAD events missing data that identifies them as 
violent or nonviolent, the NAVCO coding for violence is used.9 I code SPEED events as violent 
if the event is listed as a “politically motivated attack”, such as an “assassination”, “suicide 
attack”, or “siege/blockade”. I also code SPEED events as violent if event participants advocate 
violence. I construct a new campaign type variable by dividing the number of violent events 
linked to each campaign by the total number of events linked to each campaign. The new 
campaign type variable represents the percentage of events linked to a campaign that are violent. 
 
This paper is concerned only with anti-government campaigns, and so when possible, I 
prune the data of events that were not directed against regimes. For SCAD, I drop “pro-
government” and “intra-government” events. SPEED does not have an equivalent variable, and 
no events were dropped. 
 
After purging both datasets of observations with missing or irrelevant data, each set still 
contains thousands of events. SCAD retains 17,463 events, of which I link 158 to 17 campaigns. 
SPEED retains 19,833 events, of which I link 1,655 to 91 campaigns. In total, 102 of the 250 
NAVCO 2 campaigns are included in my analysis. 
 
Some of the campaigns preserve only one or two linked events. While this is not ideal, it 
is not necessarily problematic. Some of the events in each dataset represent an aggregate of many 
connected individual events. For instance, I have linked only one event in the SCAD database to  
 
 
8 Dropping events that do not have accurate locations may bias the results of this study. Rural events are likely more 
prone to have missing or imprecise location data (Kalyvas 2004, 160-190). Nonviolent events may also be more 
likely to have missing location data, as they are less likely to draw popular attention compared to their violent 
counterparts. Thus rural nonviolent events may be the category most likely to be dropped from the present analysis, 
while urban violent campaigns are the least likely to be dropped.  
9 This only occurs with the Chad rebels and UNITA campaigns. This data is taken from the 
“navco1designation” variable in NAVCO 2. 
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the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) campaign in Uganda. However, that event represents all 
LRA actions between 1994 and 2010. 
 
In NAVCO 2, each campaign-year is coded as achieving some level of progress, ranked 
0-4,10 towards the campaign’s goals. However, many of the matched campaigns are missing 
linked event data on individual campaign-years. Thus I only examine campaign-years for which 
campaigns achieve the most progress. For instance, in NAVCO 2, the Algerian Revolution is 
coded as making “0” progress almost every year from 1952-61. In 1962, the Algerian Revolution 
is coded as having progress of “4”, which represents “complete success” for the campaign. In my 
data, only the campaign-year with progress of “4” is captured. Thus, observations in my dataset 
represent the year in which each campaign reaches its peak, not the year that campaigns begin or 
end. A list of the campaigns and main variables included in the dataset is included in Appendix 1 
at the end of this paper. 
 
Following Fearon and Laitin (2003), and Chenoweth and Lewis (2013), I incorporate 
several controls in my analysis. These include population, GDP per capita, a measure of 
mountainous terrain in each country, ethnic fractionalization rates, and religious fractionalization 
rates. The majority of this control data is taken directly from Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) dataset, 
which covers countries between the years 1945-2000. In my dataset, 10 campaigns11 reach their 
peak after the year 2000. To add controls to these campaigns, I use Fearon and Laitin’s data from 
the year 2000, and assume that the true values do not substantially change in the missing years. 
When possible, I impute missing values with World Bank Data (2018). I also control for urban 
population as a percentage of total population in each country. I gain this data from the World 
Bank as well.12 
 
 
Baseline Analysis of the Linked Campaigns 
 
Figures 2.1 through 2.3 show the distribution of violence, urbanness, and progress among 
the linked campaigns. Immediately obvious is that the majority of campaigns are almost entirely 
violent, and a similar number are almost entirely urban. This suggests that campaigns do not 
often switch tactics or the setting in which they operate (this point is corroborated by Dahl 2014, 
4). The remaining campaigns are fairly uniformly distributed in violence and urbanness.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 From 0-4, these levels of progress represent maintaining the “status quo”, making “visible gains short of 
concessions”, achieving a “limited concession”, achieving “significant concessions”, or “complete success” for 
the campaign (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013).  
11 The campaigns are the Kifaya movement in Egypt, the Irish Republican Army, the Free Aceh Movement in 
Indonesia, the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, the Kashmiri Muslim Separatists in India, the Liberians 
United for Reconciliation and Democracy, the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, the Taliban Resistance in 
Afghanistan, the Iraqi Insurgency, and the Communist Party of Nepal Maoists.  
12 World Bank data on urbanization rates only go back to 1960. For campaigns that occur between 1955 and 1959, 
I impute the values from the World Bank from 1960 and assume minimal change in the true value. 
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Do campaign dynamics change by time period? Figure 2.4 and 2.5 report total campaign 
occurrences, and average urbanness and violence of campaigns by decade. Campaigns seem to 
be becoming more urban and common, and less violent over time. This may be due to 
demographic shifts leading to large urban population centers in cities (Kilcullen 2013).  
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Are the omitted NAVCO 2 campaigns systematically different than the linked campaigns? 
At first glance it appears that violent and unsuccessful campaigns are overrepresented in the 
linked data (Figure 2.6). However, controlling for type, linked and omitted campaigns have 
statistically equal success rates (Figure 2.7).13 Thus, while the sample overrepresents unsuccessful 
violent campaigns, this difference should not bias the analysis. 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Baseline Analysis of Linked and Omitted Campaigns  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 Pearson chi-squared tests (not shown) of independence between linkage and success of within-type 
campaigns yield p-values of .21 for violent campaigns, and .72 for nonviolent campaigns, well above 
conventional levels of significance 
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Figure 2.7: Within-Type Comparisons of Linked and Omitted Campaigns  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V. Hypotheses, Methods, and Results 
 
In this section I present my formal hypotheses and support them with analysis of the data. 
 
Is campaign type determined by campaign setting? I argue that violent campaigns are 
unable to mobilize in cities with proximity to regime security forces. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Nonviolent campaigns are more likely to occur in urban areas than rural 
areas and violent campaigns are more likely to occur in rural areas than urban areas. 
 
To test this, I conduct robust linear regressions measuring the effect of campaign setting 
on campaign type. In Table 1, I present the results of several models with different sets of 
controls. The effect of campaign setting on campaign type is statistically significant in each 
model at conventional levels. The coefficient of the explanatory variable is steady between 
each model, suggesting that an entirely urban campaign is about 60% more likely to be 
nonviolent than an entirely rural campaign. I present these results graphically in Figure 3.1 
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In the basic model I regress campaign setting against campaign type with no controls. 
The second model includes controls against potential population effects, specifically population 
size and urban population as a percent of total population. Fearon and Laitin (2003) and 
Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) find positive relationships between population size and violent 
campaign onset. I include urban population data to test whether it captures similar effects as 
campaign setting. In the population effects model, neither control is significant, and the 
coefficient of campaign setting grows. This suggests that the campaign setting data captures a 
fundamentally different phenomenon than urbanization rates. 
 
In a third model, I test whether campaign setting retains explanatory power when ethnic 
and religious fractionalization are controlled for. In this model, I find little change in the effect of 
campaign setting, though religious fractionalization is a statistically significant control. In the 
fourth model, I include GDP per capita and the percent of a country with mountainous terrain as 
controls. Neither control is significant, and there is little impact on the explanatory variable. The 
final model includes all controls. Campaign setting remains significant. These results offer strong 
support for Hypothesis 1. 
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Are urban campaigns more likely to succeed than rural campaigns? The literature 
suggests that campaigns that take place far from the regime’s seat of power are more likely 
to fail. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Urban campaigns are more likely to succeed than rural campaigns.  
To test this hypothesis, I again conduct robust linear regressions comparing the progress 
of urban and rural campaigns. I use the same five sets of controls to conduct the regressions as 
from Hypothesis 1, and present the results in Table 2. In all of the regressions, campaign 
setting is statistically significant to the 1% level. The effect of campaign setting on progress is 
surprisingly large. Each model suggests that an entirely urban campaign would have a progress 
“score” about one and a half points higher than an entirely urban campaign. In NAVCO’s 
framework, this could nearly be the difference between “maintaining the status quo” and 
achieving “limited concessions”, or between achieving “limited concessions” and “complete 
success”. I present the results graphically in Figure 3.2. 
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I also test for the presence of the mechanisms by which I argue urban campaigns are 
more successful than their rural counterparts. These include increased mobilization potential, 
increased media coverage, and increased presence of high-value targets.14 Urban nonviolent 
campaigns also benefit from security defections. 
 
To test for these mechanisms, I regress campaign setting against campaign participation, 
extent of domestic and international media coverage, and the presence of security force 
defections, all taken from NAVCO 2. The media coverage variables can take values of 0, 1, or 
2, representing no media coverage, some media coverage, or extensive media coverage of a 
given campaign. Security force defections are measured with a dummy variable. 
 
Hypothesis 3:Urban campaigns have more participants than rural campaigns. 
 
Hypothesis 4:Urban campaigns are more likely to receive increased international 
media coverage than rural campaigns. 
 
Hypothesis 5:Urban campaigns are more likely to receive increased domestic media 
coverage than rural campaigns. 
 
Hypothesis 6:Urban nonviolent campaigns are more likely to induce security force 
defections than rural nonviolent campaigns.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 I am unable to operationalize the presence of high-value targets in urban areas and thus do not quantitatively test for 
it. However, I consider the effect that high-value targets have on urban campaigns in the case study section. 
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I find a statistically significant effect from urban setting on mobilization and domestic 
media coverage, though I fail to find an effect on international media coverage or security 
defections. The results suggest that a fully urban campaign would mobilize about 75% more 
participants that a fully rural campaign, and would receive about a two-thirds jump in domestic 
media coverage “score”. Results are reported in Table 3. 
 
Finally, I hypothesize that nonviolent campaigns are not more likely to succeed than 
violent campaigns once campaign setting is accounted for. 
 
Hypothesis 7:Controlling for campaign setting, campaign type has no effect on success.  
I conduct robust linear regressions measuring the effect that campaign resistance tactic 
has on success. I use the same regression battery I have used throughout my analysis, though I 
now include both campaign setting and campaign type in the analysis. I present results in Table  
4. The results are mixed in support of Hypothesis 7. In the first four models, campaigns setting is 
statistically significant, and suggests that a fully urban campaign would receive 1 progress 
“point” higher than a fully rural campaign. In these models, campaign type is not significant. 
However, in the fifth model where I include all of the controls, I find that campaign type 
becomes statistically significant while campaign setting loses significance. 
 
 
Analysis 
 
I find strong evidence of endogeneity between campaign setting, type, and success. I find 
some evidence of the presence of theorized mechanisms by which urban campaigns are more 
successful than rural campaigns. Finally, I find that when campaigns setting is controlled for, 
campaign type loses much, if not all, of its predictive power on campaign success. 
 
With only 102 observations, these results should be viewed more as exploratory than as 
definitive. Further, while I attempt to address endogeneity concerns in existing literature on 
nonviolent research, the present study suffers from endogeneity issues as well. 
 
Most concerning is the possibility that campaigns will tend to occur in urban areas when 
the regime is weak. If this is the case, then the campaign setting variable does not reflect the 
effect of urbanness on campaigns, but the current strength of the regime. Some evidence suggests 
this may be the case. As previously mentioned, Buhaug (2010) finds that violent campaigns are 
more likely to occur in the rural periphery until the power of the campaigns rivals that of the 
regime. 
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VI. Iran and the 1977-79 Islamic Revolution 
 
This section tests the paper’s theory through a case study of Iran since 1890, with a focus 
on the 1977-79 Islamic Revolution. Iran is a useful case to consider for several reasons. First, the 
1977-79 revolution is often pointed to as evidence of the power of nonviolent resistance. I argue 
that the role of nonviolence in the Islamic Revolution is overstated, and demonstrate that the 
success of the Islamic Revolution was due to its urban roots. Second, Iran has a revolutionary 
past which offers within-country cases to compare the Islamic Revolution against. Between 1890 
and 1995, it had had more revolutions than any other Muslim country, and “more than all but one 
or two Third World countries” (Keddie 1995, 60). These revolutions varied between peaceful 
and violent over time, but the successful ones have always been urban (Keddie 1975, 76; 
Behrooz 2004, 200). Third, Iran is useful because some evidence suggests that it may be a “hard 
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case” against which to test this paper’s theory (Rapport 2015). These points are discussed at 
the end of this section. 
 
 
The Tobacco Concession Protests: 1891-92 
 
In the late nineteenth century, Britain and Russia began asserting control over the Iranian 
economy and state, drawing concern from Iranians of all classes. Merchants worried that foreign 
entrepreneurs would secure special privileges. The ulema (Islamic clergy) preached against the 
effect that foreign influence would have on Islam in Iran (Martin 2005, 59) 
 
In March 1890, Shah Mozaffar ad-Din signed a secret agreement with a British company 
granting a concession over the entire Iranian tobacco industry. The agreement “conceded a monopoly 
over the production, sale, and export of all Iranian tobacco to a British subject” (Keddie 1981, 66). 
When news of the concession became public in 1891, Iranians were incensed. Tobacco represented a 
considerable portion of the Iranian economy, and profited “many landholders, shopkeepers, and 
exporters” (Keddie 1981, 66). Even Iranians unconnected to the tobacco industry opposed the 
concession, fearing that ceding control over an “entirely Iranian product” would lead to the 
establishment of a British colonial state in Iran (Pesaran 2011, 23). 
 
Large scale protests against the concession began in spring of 1981 in the city of Shiraz. 
When the religious leader of the Shiraz movement was exiled to Iraq, the movement quickly 
spread to Tabriz, another major city. Within a few weeks, the protests had spread to Mashhad, 
Isfahan, and Tehran. Because the movement rapidly spread to multiple cities, the government 
was unable to use its armed forces to restore order. By January 1892, the government was forced 
to cancel the concession entirely (Browne 1910, 51; Martin 2005, 24). The urban movement 
marked the first successful mass demonstrations in modern Iran. 
 
 
The Constitutional Revolution: 1905-11 
 
In 1905, less than a decade and a half after the Tobacco uprisings, revolution would spread 
in Iranian cities once again. Corruption in the Iranian state was breeding discontent. Foreign events, 
such as Japan’s adoption of a constitution and subsequent victory over Russia in the Russo-Japanese 
War of 1904-05, further spread desire for change in Iran (Azimi 2008, 29). 
 
When the governor of Tehran beat several sugar merchants for not lowering their sugar 
prices as ordered, many members of the ulema and working class in the city took to the streets to 
demand a “house of justice”, a term which would remain vague for some time (Abrahamian 
1979, 405; Keddie 1981, 72-73). In the face of widespread opposition, and anxious to begin a 
European vacation, the shah dismissed the governor of Tehran and agreed to the protesters 
demands (Abrahamian 1979, 404). 
 
However, the shah displayed no intent of carrying out the reforms that he had promised. 
Instead, acts of violence against Iranian citizens continued throughout the country. By July 1906, 
more than ten thousand protesters took to the streets in Tehran, bringing business to a halt 
(Keddie 1981, 73). As the protestors’ numbers grew, so too did their demands. They now sought 
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the establishment of a majlis (parliament), and the idea of a constitution “began to be 
discussed by the advanced reformers” (Keddie 1981, 73). 
 
Near the end of his life, the shah finally gave in to the protesters’ demands. Within 
months, Iran elected its first majlis, which was quick to demonstrate its independence from the 
shah. Members of the majlis drafted a progressive constitution for the country. The Iranian 
constitution specified that the majlis “alone was responsible for authoritative interpretation of 
laws - and, by implication, the Constitution itself” (Azimi 2008, 20). “Equality before the 
law” and other civil rights were also guaranteed (Keddie 1981, 74). 
 
Shah Mozaffar ad-Din’s successor, Mohammad Ali, wished to dissolve the majlis. In 
1908 he launched a successful coup d’etat, shuttered the majlis, and executed leaders of the 
opposition. While he was easily able to cement his authoritarian control over most of the 
country, the city of Tabriz “held out against royal forces” (Keddie 1981, 76). As the 
opposition’s chances of holding the city diminished, many of the fighters fled to join with other 
revolutionary forces in the province of Gilan, 200 miles north of Tehran. The revolutionaries 
then moved towards the capital. At the same time, a tribe from southwest Iran marched north to 
converge on Tehran. By July 1909, the shah was forced from his throne and replaced by his son. 
 
A new majlis was elected, but various provinces remained uncooperative with the central 
government, many refusing to pay taxes. To restore order, the majlis decided to enlist the support of 
American consultants. Citing a 1907 agreement between Moscow and London regarding the 
signatories’ administration of Iran, Russia demanded that the majlis dismiss the American 
consultants. The majlis resisted, but when Russian forces began moving towards Tehran in 1911, the 
cabinet caved, accepting Moscow’s demands and dissolving the majlis (Keddie 1981, 77). 
 
The cabinet’s dissolution of the majlis marked the end of the Constitutional Revolution. 
In some ways, the revolution might be considered a failure, in that the majlis was shuttered. 
However, the the civil rights reforms, regularized financial practices, and constitution itself 
would endure (Keddie 1981, 77). Important for this paper’s argument, these victories were 
secured by violent force in urban areas. 
 
 
Revolt in Time of Turmoil: The Kuchek Khan Revolution 
 
Shortly after the Constitutional Revolution, the world would go to war, and Iran was 
caught in the middle. Iran attempted to remain neutral during World War I, but due to its 
strategic location it became a major battlefield (Pordeli et al 2017). During the war, much of 
Iran’s already limited transportation and agricultural infrastructure was destroyed, and Iran’s 
“population became completely impoverished” (Nirumand 1969, 24). As World War I ended, 
Iran’s troubles did not. The economic and social tolls of the war in Iran would lead to a 
terrible famine from 1917-19. By some estimates, Iran’s population fell from more than 20 
million in 1914 to just 11 million in 1919 (Majd 2003, 47). 
 
The turmoil of the time period gave rise to nationalistic revolutionary movements. 
The most prominent campaign was led by Mirza Kuchek Khan in the province of Gilan. The 
rebellion, which consisted of peasants operating largely in the forest, financed itself by 
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kidnapping and ransoming wealthy citizens in the region. The tactic earned the movement’s 
members the name “Jangalis”(forest dwellers), and was so effective that by 1918 the Jangalis 
controlled Gilan and several nearby provinces (Lenczowski 1968, 54-58). 
 
During this time, Russia and Britain continued to exert influence in Iran, interfering 
with the role of the state. Kuchek Khan’s movement took advantage of this confusion, growing 
in strength until he “declared the establishment of an Iranian Soviet Socialist Republic” from 
his headquarters in Gilan in 1920, threatening the central government (Keddie 1981, 84). Later 
that year, the Jangalis would gain control of the Mazandaran province, but the campaign began 
suffering from ideological differences. Leftists called for land nationalization and redistribution, 
policies which Kuchek Khan disagreed with (Keddie 1981, 85). Hundreds of miles from Tehran 
and lacking cohesion, the Jangalis were becoming less threatening to the central government. 
 
 
The Rise of Reza Khan and the Republican Movement: 1921-24 
 
Though initially successful, Kucheck Khan’s movement suffered from its distance from the 
capital. In 1921, Sayyed Zia ad-Din, a pro-British moderate, and Cossack Brigade commander 
Reza Khan would find success where Kuchek Khan had failed by directly entering Tehran and 
launching a coup. Sayyed Zia became prime minister, and Reza Khan war minister. 
 
Despite Reza Khan’s title, his portfolio was not limited to matters of warfare. Though 
some of his early initiatives included strengthening the army and quelling tribal movements, he 
also led programs focused on “the growth of trade and of the civil services, and the rejection of 
open British control” (Keddie 1981, 87). Reza Khan’s other early efforts included centralization 
of tax collection and finances, though he had ambitions to modernize the nation’s infrastructure 
and further improve the army. To do so, he would need to gather capital. Perhaps aware of the 
danger that urban areas posed to the central government, he was careful not to raise taxes in 
urban areas, or to otherwise anger urban populations. He reached out to the United States to offer 
an oil concession, which began yielding modest revenues for Iran. To supplement the oil income, 
Reza Khan levied taxes on agricultural products such as tea and sugar, mainly affecting lower 
classes and rural peoples. To fill the ranks of the newly empowered military, he drafted peasants 
(Cobb 2012, 43; Milani 1988, 62). 
 
In 1921, Reza Khan forced Sayyed Zia from power, and a new cabinet was formed 
under Qavam as-Saltaneh, a liberal politician, though real power increasingly resided with Reza 
Khan (Keddi 1981, 88). The new regime’s priority was to suppress ongoing rebellions, chief 
among them Kuchek Khan’s. The continued disunity in the Jangali campaign made it “relatively 
easy” for Reza Khan’s forces to march in to Gilan and end the rebellion by the end of 1921 
(Keddie 1981, 88). 
 
Other popular uprisings broke out in 1921 and 1922, but by the early 1920s, “all protest 
movements were put down”. By 1923, Reza Khan felt secure enough in his position to push Shah 
as-Saltaneh from the throne, and became Prime Minister (Keddie 1981, 89, 91). He did not 
immediately seek the position of shah, and instead strove to abolish the monarchy and establish 
an Iranian republic (Martin 1994, 203). This vision was initially well received by many Iranian 
citizens and prominent political parties, though the republican movement was thwarted by the 
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ulema.15 The ulema associated republicanism with Western politics and culture, and were 
concerned with the future of Islam in a republican state (Akhavi 1980, 29). Further, having heard 
of Kemal Ataturk’s uprooting of Islam in Turkey through the creation of a republican state, the 
ulema feared that Reza Khan had similar goals in mind (Akhavi 1980, 29; Atabaki and Zurcher 
2004, 45-58). To oppose the shift to republicanism, the ulema turned to urban bazaaris 
(members of the merchant and worker class), with whom they held considerable influence 
(Atabaki and Zurcher 2004, 58). 
 
On 19 March, 1924, thousands of Iranians took to the streets in Tehran to oppose the 
establishment of a republic. Three days later, when the majlis was to debate changing the 
constitution to create a republic, around 5,000 clerics, bazaaris, and ordinary Iranians protested 
the change outside the majlis building, shouting anti-republican slogans. The ulema organized a 
large meeting in the Shah Mosque, and preached against Reza Khan. In response, Reza Khan 
gathered two companies of the Pahlavi regiment, and ordered them to clear the area around the 
majlis building “at bayonet point” (Martin 1994, 206). As he entered the majlis building, the 
President, Mu’Tamin al-Mulk, rebuked him for using force against the people. After several 
other majlis deputies and ulema elites expressed their disapproval of an Iranian republic, Reza 
Khan “agreed to relinquish the republican cause, released about 200 jailed demonstrators and 
promised to respect Islam” (Martin 1994, 206). 
 
 
Autocratic Modernization: Reza Khan Becomes Reza Shah: 1925-41 
 
Reza Khan failed to establish an Iranian republic, but he had not given up on modernizing 
the nation in other ways. He continued to cement his control over the army and lobbied members 
of the majlis for support. In October 1925, he secured a bill from the majlis terminating the 
shah’s dynasty, and later that year was crowned shah himself. 
 
From this point, the Pahlavi regime was characterized by “autocratic modernization” 
(McDaniel 2014; Atabaki and Zurcher 2004). Key sectors in Iran, including industry, 
agriculture, healthcare, and education, lagged far behind other Muslim countries. To realize his 
vision of a modernized Iran, Reza Shah would rule with an iron fist. 
 
One of his first orders of business was to silence the opposition. He arrested the former 
head of the majlis, Mudarres, and had him executed. Other politicians and writers shared 
similar fates. Even some of Reza Shah’s own aides were killed if suspected of disloyalty to the 
regime (Keddie 1981, 94). 
 
The army and the civil bureaucracy would be the pillars of Reza Khan’s regime, and he 
strove to continuously improve them (Eisenstadt 2011, 2). The civil service was a helpful tool to 
educate young men, and gave them opportunities for white collar employment. To help win the 
support of urban Iranians, Reza Shah centralized the civil service as much as possible in the 
capital (Keddie 1981, 95).  
 
 
 
15 Some argue that Reza Khan’s republican movement was instead quashed by “his political enemies in 
Tehran” (Martin 1994). 
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Iran’s trading system was also modernized. Tariffs were emplaced to protect domestic 
industry. Foreign exchange controls were implemented in 1930 to regulate the fall of the rial. To 
facilitate transport of goods throughout the country, Reza Shah also followed through on his 
early efforts to establish a national railroad system, spending billions of rials (Banani 1961, 130-
134). 
 
 
Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and the Roots of the Islamic Revolution: 1941-71 
 
During World War II, Shah Pahlavi’s attempts to remain neutral led to an invasion of 
British and Soviet forces, who forced the succession of the shah’s son, Shah Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi (Curtis and Hooglund 1978). The war disrupted the Iranian economy, and it “took a 
decade for GDP per capita to return to its 1939 level (Esfahani and Pesaran 2009, 7). Oil 
revenues remained the largest source of national income, and prices were rising. However, Iran’s 
royalties were not pegged to the price of oil, and so Iranians did not benefit from the booming 
oil market. Public demand for nationalization of the oil industry started to spread (Esfahani and 
Pesaran 2009, 8). 
 
In 1951, the oil issue would dominate majlis elections, leading to a landslide victory for 
Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh, who quickly nationalized the country’s oil fields. In 
disagreement with the Prime Minister over oil nationalization, the shah was forced to flee Iran. In 
1953, the United States organized a coup in Iran through covert cooperation with discontent 
Ayatollahs, and by paying mobs of people to protest against the Prime Minister, placing Shah 
Pahlavi in power for the next 26 years (Allen-Ebrahimian 2017; Milani 1988, 87). 
 
Shah Pahlavi, like his father, aimed to solidify his power over Iran while industrializing 
the country and reducing the influence of Islam in its culture and politics. Shah Pahlavi’s regime 
benefited from spectacular oil and gas revenues. Using the country’s resource income, the shah 
was able to further pursue modernization. The drive to shift exports away from traditional 
agricultural products and oil towards industrial products was demonstrated by the shah’s five 
development plans. The first two plans (1949-56 and 1956-62) focused on transportation 
infrastructure, while the Third (1962-68), Fourth (1968-73), and Fifth (1973-78) concentrated on 
commercial industrialization (Carey and Carey 1975). During the final three development plans, 
as much as 60% of all industrial investment was by the state, while tariffs as high as 200% or 
300% were placed on imports in order to promote domestic production (Halliday 1979,  
149-150). To further finance his industrial initiatives, the shah established market boards which 
forced peasants to sell their agricultural products to the state well below market rate. The state 
would then resell these commodities on the open market for a profit (Rezazadeh 1979, 148-152). 
 
The shah’s policies, fueled by the increased resource revenue, proved amazingly effective 
at industrializing Iran. In the twenty years from 1954-73, industry was the fastest growing sector 
of the economy. In the period 1965-75, commercial industries reached an average annual growth 
rate greater than 15% (Carey and Carey 1975). However, the high protective tariffs allowed 
Iranian firms’ efficiency to lag behind that of other countries (Halliday 1979, 162). Iranian 
consumers were forced to pay relatively high prices for industrial goods. Figure 2.1below shows 
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the growth of manufacturing output in Iran over the past five decades. Just before the shah was 
overthrown, the growth in manufacturing value-added reached 30%, an astonishing feat.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank Data 2018 
 
The growth and industrialization of cities was costly for rural areas. Recall that the 
Pahlavis restricted civil service positions to the capital, drafted peasants to fill the ranks of the 
military, and raised much of the revenue for industrialization by taxing agricultural output. As a 
result, Iranians began flowing from rural to urban areas in large numbers (Brugman 2009,  
66-70). Between 1966 and 1979 the urban population in Iran rose from about 37% to 49% of 
the total population (see Figure 2.2), and urban land prices rose 2,000 percent (Parsa 1989, 76). 
 
To pursue this ambitious modernization effort, Shah Pahlavi believed that a harsh rule 
was necessary. The shah made this point clear in an interview with Italian journalist Oriana 
Fallaci: “Believe me, when three quarters of a nation doesn’t know how to read or write, you can 
provide for reforms only by the strictest authoritarianism - otherwise you get nowhere” (quoted 
in Thiessen 2008, 16). The shah took the modernized army he inherited from his father, 
strengthened it with aid from the United States, and “shaped it primarily as a force dedicated to 
the defense of the monarchy” (Ibrahim 1979). He also used aid from the United States to create a 
fearsome secret police, the SAVAK (an acronym for the National Organization for Information 
and Security) (Milani 1988, 78). The SAVAK infiltrated universities, censored media outlets, 
disempowered labor unions, and prohibited oppositional political parties. Those who expressed 
dissent were subject to arrest, torture, and were often “disappeared” (Ibrahim 1979). 
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Khomeini’s Failed Revolution: 1960-64 
 
From 1953 to 1960, the shah was relatively secure on his throne. He enjoyed a “peaceful, 
if not amicable” relationship with the ulema, some of whom had supported the 1953 coup 
(Allen-Ebrahimian 2017; Milani 1988, 87). When the shah attempted to institute land reform in 
1959, however, prominent Ayatollahs publicly opposed the bill. Tensions continued to escalate 
as the shah promoted female emancipation (Sedghi 2007, 66), dissolved the majlis (Walz 1961), 
and instituted a “de facto recognition of the state of Israel” (Milani 1988, 88). 
 
In the 1960s, the ulema began to resist in full, and Ayatollah Khomeini rose to national 
prominence. In August 1960, shortly after Egypt broke off diplomatic relations with Iran for its 
relationship with Israel, 150 ulema issued a fatwacalling on Muslims to initiate a jihad against 
the shah (Enayat 2005, 50). In 1962, and again in 1963, the Ayatollah helped direct campaigns in 
which the ulema opposed a Local Council Election and National Referendum that would grant 
suffrage to women. In 1964 the Ayatollah led resistance against an order granting “capitulatory 
rights to American advisers and military personnel in Iran” (Milani 1988, 90). 
 
In response, the shah’s army attacked theological schools administered by the Ayatollahs, 
beating and killing several students. State media depicted the Ayatollahs and their supporters as 
“black reactionaries” who wished to “return Iran to the dark ages” (Milani 1988, 91). The 
Ayatollahs, however, were undeterred. 
 
In June 1963, Ayatollah Khomeini openly attacked the shah in a speech delivered in 
Qom. He and several other Ayatollahs were quickly arrested, sparking the outbreak of the 
first mass riots in Iranian cities since the 1953 coup. Crowds carried portraits of Khomeini 
and chanted anti-government slogans. Mobs unsuccessfully attempted to take control of radio 
stations and industrial buildings in Tehran (Milani 1988, 92). 
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The regime responded viciously. Tehran and other cities were placed under martial law, 
as members of the army and police killed protesters in the streets. Estimates of how many were 
killed vary. The official government estimate claims 20 people were killed and 1,000 were 
injured, while the opposition claims thousands died (Milani 1988, 92). Years later, The New 
York Times would report a human “cost of hundreds killed or wounded” (Ibrahim 1979). 
Ayatollah Khomeini was exiled to Turkey, but soon moved to Iraq, from where he would 
continue to influence resistance against the shah. 
 
 
Violent Resistance to the Shah: 1964-79 
 
During the 1960s the shah made clear that he intended on implementing his vision of 
modernization in Iran with or without popular support. One leading author on violent resistance 
to the shah’s regime has described opposition groups’ political mood in the late 1960s Iran as 
one of “apathy and despair” (Behrooz 2004, 195). Thus far, the regime had been easily able to 
crush opposition parties, labor unions, and independent media organizations, and had “also 
been very successful in frustrating any attempt at reorganization” (Behrooz 2004, 195). As 
Iranians became convinced that urban nonviolent resistance was failing, and as they heard of 
successful guerrilla movements in Cuba and Algeria, they became convinced that the only way 
to effect change in the country was to take up arms against the shah’s regime. 
 
Two organizations are especially notable: The Revolutionary Organization of the Tudeh 
Party of Iran (ROTPI), and the Organization of People’s Fadai Guerrillas (the Fedaiyan). 
 
The ROTPI was the only group violently active in the 1960s. The ROTPI “used 
violence and propaganda to rally the Iranian peasantry in a classic Maoist” strategy (Behrooz 
2004, 194). In a country rapidly urbanizing, this method was doomed to fail, and none of their 
efforts were met with success. 
 
In 1964, the ROTPI sent members to aid a rebellion in southern Iran led by a nomadic 
tribe. The uprising was small, and the government crushed it by 1965. Later that year, the group 
attempted to assassinate the shah. A private in the movement opened fire at the shah near his 
palace in Tehran. Unfortunately for the organization, the shah escaped, the assassin was killed, 
and the group was quickly arrested by the SAVAK (Vahabzadeh 2010, 8; Behrooz 2004, 195). 
Finally, in 1967, ROTPI members traveled to assist a budding revolt in Iranian Kurdistan. When 
the ROTPI members reached the Iran-Iraq border, “the rebellion was already crushed and its 
leaders killed” (Behrooz 2004, 195). 
 
The Fedaiyan enjoyed more success than the ROTPI and other guerrilla groups (Behrooz 
1990, 1). Established in 1971, the Fedaiyan were originally a composite of two other groups that 
had suffered severe losses to the SAVAK while attempting to organize: a Marxist-Leninist 
group, and a group with mainly religious backgrounds (Behrooz 2000, 44). However, as the 
Fedaiyan would take casualties during their struggle, their ranks would replenish with the 
addition of other groups. Thus there was never one single Fedai group, but many groups acting 
under the same name to increase their notoriety (Vahabzadeh 2010, 46). Many Fedaiyan lacked 
formal training, which cost them dearly in their first attack in 1971 on a military-police post. The 
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post was located in a village in the province of Gilan, a key location in the Constitutional 
Revolution, and the base of Kuchek Khan’s rebellion in the 1920s. 
 
By the time of the attack, the organization had already been infiltrated by the SAVAK, 
and four members of the organization had been arrested (Vahabzadeh 2010, 22-27). The attack 
quickly fell apart in its execution, with members making seemingly amateur mistakes, such as 
seizing “weapons without taking ammunition, and forget[ting] their leaflets and explosives 
inside” a post that they had captured (Vahabzadeh 2010, 27). At least one of the guerrillas 
would die to friendly fire from a comrade. The shah, wishing to project the strength of the 
regime, sent in an entire army regiment, hundreds of police officers, and several helicopters 
(Vahabzadeh 2010, 27). 
 
The attack might be viewed as a failure, in that in short order “all the guerrillas were 
caught, and the majority killed” (Behrooz 2000, 52). However, the assault had symbolic 
significance. The shah’s extreme use of force to combat the Fedaiyan attack made them seem 
more powerful than they were and inspired other Iranians to oppose the shah. In the long run the 
operation was a success in that it inspired other guerrilla groups, and began eight years of 
guerrilla resistance to the shah’s regime (Behrooz 2004, 191; Vahabzadeh 2010, 28). 
 
After the failure of the attack in Gilan, the Fedaiyan adopted largely urban tactics in the 
cities of Tehran and Tabriz. One Fedai group was able to assassinate a Lieutenant-General in 
1971. In response, SAVAK spread wanted posters for the group’s known members, offering 
rewards of up to one million rials. The posters may have backfired, increasing the profile of the 
guerrillas. Over the next two years, the Fedai groups would rob banks for financing, and disrupt 
the state by destroying power lines and bombing prominent buildings or state rallies. During this 
time, the Fedaiyan suffered heavy casualties, with dozens of its members killed or captured. By 
1973, more members were in prison than active (Vahabzadeh 2010, 32-37). 
 
In 1973, the Fedaiyan secured large donations from supporters in Iran and abroad, and 
merged with another guerrilla group. Together, they went on the offensive. By 1976 they had 
assassinated several prominent businessmen, SAVAK agents and administrators, and bombed 
several military and police headquarters. The Fedaiyan paid dearly for their continued 
activism, and many members, including several leaders of the organization were tortured and 
killed (Vahabzadeh 2010, 36-38). 
 
Though they operated within the capital, the Fedaiyan did not pose an existential threat 
to the regime. Occasional assassinations and bombings earned them notoriety, but not the 
revolution that they were hoping for. Bijan Jizani, one of the leaders of the movement theorized 
of three stages of a revolutionary guerrilla movement. First, guerrillas demonstrate sustained 
armed opposition. Second, they win the support of the masses. Finally, the participation in the 
revolution becomes widespread and topples the regime (Vahabzadeh 2010, 44). To complete the 
second and third stages of the movement, the Fedaiyan began to reach out to the working class. 
After conducting assassinations or bombings, members would publicize how the operation had 
benefited the working class. Before the Fedaiyan could complete the latter two steps, however, 
its remaining leadership was caught and killed, and the movement largely dissolved in 1976. 
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The Islamic Revolution: 1977-79 
 
Where the Fedaiyan guerrillas failed to achieve mass mobilization, the 1977-79 Iranian 
Revolution would succeed. Indeed, the Islamic Revolution was more popular and successful than 
any movement in Iran before or since that time. There are many explanations in the literature for 
why the Islamic Revolution began. Economic stagnation in 1976 and 1977 despite massive oil 
revenues led to widespread discontent in urban areas. President Carter’s election in 1976 may 
have signaled to Iranians that the United States would assist in the event of a revolution, as 
President Carter had been outspoken about Iran’s human rights abuses during his campaign. The 
shah, who was ill with cancer, may have relaxed the level of repression he once exercised 
(Keddie 1981, 231-232; Kurzman 2004, 1-6). 
 
While there exist several explanations for why the movement succeeded in hindsight, at 
the time, the success of the Islamic Revolution caught the world by surprise. The twenty-five-
year-old regime was supported by massive oil revenues, the largest military in the region, and 
pervasive secret police. Even by the fall of 1978, the shah’s grip on the country seemed secure. 
At a lavish New Year’s Eve party in Tehran in January 1978, President Carter would toast Iran 
as “an island of stability” (Ibrahim 1979). As late as September 1978, the Defense Intelligence 
Agency predicted the shah would “remain actively in power over the next ten years“ (Defense 
Intelligence Agency 1978, originally quoted in Kurzman 2009). 
 
Whatever its proximate cause, the revolution began among intellectuals. In the summer of 
1977, lawyers began publicly protesting the unfair court system. Poets arranged a Writer’s 
Association to demand an end to censorship. Teachers and students clamored for academic 
freedom in universities (Dolan 2009). At first, the regime did not respond to these groups with 
violence, though as demonstrations mounted, police response became increasingly ruthless 
(Kurzman 2004, 18). As the campaign gained visibility, Ayatollah Khomeini, still in exile, began 
issuing speeches and distributing pamphlets in support of the movement (Kurzman 2004, 21-24). 
In October 1977, Ayatollah Khomeini’s eldest son, in prime health, suddenly died. When word 
of his passing reached Iran, demonstrations broke out across cities in the country. “Death to the 
shah”, a notably violent mantra, became some protestors’ slogan (Kurzman 2004, 25-27). 
 
As protests against the shah continued, Ayatollah Khomeini was able to guide them by 
leveraging the extensive mosque network in Iran. Mosques in Iran, which numbered more than 
9,000 at the time, had considerable influence over other groups and institutions in the country, 
perhaps most importantly the bazaaris (Vakili-Zad 1990, 9). The regime, aware of the danger 
that the mosque network posed, cracked down on meetings in mosques and attempted to 
undermine the role of the ulema (Kurzman 2004, 35-40). 
 
In attempting to subvert Ayatollah Khomeini’s influence in Iran, the regime would light 
the “spark that set off the revolution” in full (Eisenstadt 2011, 2). In January 1978, a government 
newspaper accused Ayatollah Khomeini of being a British spy. Furious, the ulema staged a 
protest in Qum, where they called for the dissolution of the single party system. At the same 
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time, thousands of theology students protested in the streets until they were forced away by police. 
Several of the students died, and many were wounded (Dolan 2009; Eisenstadt 2011, 3)16. 
 
The fortieth day after the protests in Qum, protesters gathered to mourn those who were 
lost, creating more martyrs in Tabriz. Forty days after the protests in Tabriz, protests again 
broke out in dozens of cities, creating a forty day cycle of mourning protests that proved 
difficult for the regime to control (Kurzman 2004, 50). Rasler (1996) analyzes Iranian 
newspapers from the time of the revolution, collecting event-level data on the progress of the 
movement. She finds that the campaign was nearly equally split between violent and nonviolent 
protests, with a full 44% of protests involving “large-scale attacks on liquor stores, restaurants, 
cinemas, banks, beauty shops, and state party headquarters” (Rasler 1996, 137). 
 
It was in response to these “continuing outbreaks of violence” that the shah put all of 
Iran’s armed forces on alert on 14 August (Nikazmerad 1980, 332). By 8 September, he 
declared martial law in major cities and ordered the killing of any demonstrators who refused to 
disperse. When groups gathered in spite of the threats, they were massacred. According to 
Kurzman, “[e]stimates of casualties on this day, which came to be known as ‘Black Friday’ 
range from fewer than one hundred to many thousands” (2004, 75). 
 
Following Black Friday, Iranians began substituting riots for massive coordinated strikes. 
The government attempted to force the Iranians to work, but lacked the manpower to end every 
strike. Within just a few months, several key groups had staged strikes, notably Iran Air, the 
telecommunications sector, bank employees, customs officials and employees of oil companies 
(Kurzman 2004, 112, 113). The collapse of Iranian oil production was particularly damaging to 
the shah, as it brought the Iranian economy to its knees (Dolan 2009). Desperate, the shah 
attempted to send in employees loyal to the government to staff critical positions, but they were 
untrained, unskilled, and unable to fill in for the usual workers (Kurzman 2004, 112). 
 
In December 1978, while millions of civilians riots against the shah in cities across the 
country, “the military experienced its first major act of rebellion”, spelling the beginning of the 
end for the shah’s regime (Eisenstadt 2011, 3). On 11 December in Tehran’s Lavisan Barracks, 
soldiers “killed more than a dozen officers and wounded many more” (Eisenstadt 2011, 3). As 
news of the incident spread, other soldiers committed similar acts of mutiny. Soon, entire units 
were confined to their barracks. 
 
It was amid this violent turmoil that the shah agreed to allow his longtime political 
opponent Shahpour Bakhtiar to form a new government. Sensing the end of the regime, General 
Gholam Ali Oveissi resigned on 4 January 1979, further weakening military morale. Without the 
support of the military, the one-time pillar of the Pahlavi regimes, the shah departed the country 
on 16 January. Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran in February to a cheering crowd of three 
million people, and consolidated political power by November (Eisenstadt 2011, 4-5; Keddie 
1981, 252-256). Aware of the urban forces that had put him into power, and perhaps fearful of 
the possibility that that power might be stripped from him, one of Ayatollah Khomeini’s first  
 
 
 
16 Estimates vary as to how many students were killed on this day. For instance, Dolan (2009) writes that two 
students were killed, while Eisenstadt (2011) writes that the police killed six and wounded many more. 
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actions in office was to “stem migration to urban areas” (Central Intelligence Agency 1986, iii).  
He would remain in office as Iran’s Supreme Leader for nearly a decade. 
 
 
Protest in Iran Since the 1979 Revolution 
 
Despite the success of the 1977-79 revolution, and the relative frequency of revolutions 
in Iran (Keddie 1995, 76), anti-government protests in Iran have been rare since Ayatollah 
Khomeini came to power (Eltagouri 2018). Two movements in this time period are notable: 
the Green Movement of 2009-10, and the demonstrations that began in 2017 and continue to 
the present day. 
 
The Green Movement began on 13 June 2009 as Iranians protested in city streets, 
claiming that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had stolen the presidential elections held a 
day prior (Worth and Fathi 2009). In the first day of the movement, hundreds of thousands of 
protestors poured onto Tehran’s streets, initially catching security forces unprepared. When the 
police and Revolutionary Guard mobilized, they reacted violently, beating thousands of 
protesters, arresting hundreds, and killing dozens (Milani 2010, 2,3). The movement was not 
slowed. In just a few months, the Green Movement grew to a “nation-wide force” taking to the 
streets every few weeks (Milani 2010,1). 
 
As the Green Movement progressed, many had hope that it would succeed as a pioneer in 
the use of social media networks and text messaging to organize events (Rahimi 2011; Milani 
2010). Iranians have had access to the internet since the early 1990s, but this was one of the first 
and largest instances in which the internet had been used to coordinate resistance events. 
Unfortunately for the movement, the Iranian government had some experience dealing with 
online dissidence in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and was able to censor much online 
communication that occurred during the Green Movement. This censorship, combined with 
increasingly ruthless repression by state security forces, effectively ended the movement in early 
February, seven months after protests first began (Milani 2010, 5). 
 
Another string of mass demonstrations began in 2017 and has continued to the present day. 
One reporter from The Washington Post has described the events as “the most serious internal 
crisis the country has faced this decade” (Eltagouri 2018). However, aside from some protests that 
occurred in the city of Mashhad, the protests have been largely rural, “not a repeat of a past urban, 
secular uprisings” (Nasr 2018). Because they are the main beneficiaries of President Rouhani’s 
economic policies, urbanites have not joined in on the movement against him. There has been 
strikingly little attention paid to the anti-government movement in Tehran. 
 
Earlier this year, when Tehran University students attempted to initiate a mass 
demonstration against the government, shouting “Proud Iranians, support us”, they found 
passerbys uninterested in their message (Erdbrink 2018). As one prominent scholar of Iran has 
noted, “Without Tehran joining the protests, they never really posed an existential threat to the 
Islamic Republic” (Nasr 2018). Those hopeful that the current protests will lead to major change 
in Iran should not hold their breath. 
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Analysis 
 
Was the success of the Islamic Revolution due to its use of nonviolence, as Chenoweth 
and Stephan (2011) argue, or due to its urban roots? I argue here that the campaign’s nonviolent 
acts were not significantly more effective than its violent acts at achieving regime change. I also 
argue that the urban setting of the nonviolent acts against the regime were critical to their 
effectiveness, and place the Islamic Revolution in historical perspective. 
 
Though the Iranian Revolution is often pointed to as an example of a successful 
nonviolent campaign, it had substantial violent elements which helped carry it to victory. As 
previously mentioned, Rasler (1996) analyzes event-level data from the Iranian Revolution and 
finds that nearly half of the movement’s protest acts were violent. Rassler also empirically tests 
the effect that violent and nonviolent protest acts had on gaining concessions from the shah. She 
finds that nonviolent protests were only slightly more effective at inducing concessions than 
violent protests (1996, 141). Further the shah’s departure from Iran was immediately preceded 
by several high profile and violent military defections (Eisenstadt 2011,3; Nikazmerad 1980). 
 
The Iranian Revolution was not wholly nonviolent, but it was almost entirely urban. As 
Kurzman writes, “The countryside - despite its impoverishment - did not, by and large, 
participate in the revolution” (Kurzman 2004, 100). Other researchers agree that villagers were 
“apolitical” (Hooglund 2012. 141), and that “the peasantry were by and large bystanders” 
(Moaddel 1992, 69). Those villagers who did support the revolution generally had ties to urban 
areas (Hooglund 2012, 144). This urban base was critical to the success of the campaign. Had the 
revolution been conducted far from urban centers, mass mobilization and general strikes would 
have been substantially more difficult to coordinate, and would have had few high-profile targets 
to sabotage. During the revolution, it was these general strikes, especially in the oil sector, which 
halted the Iranian economy, cutting off the “regime’s financial lifeblood” (Kurzman 2004, 78). 
 
Comparison of the Islamic Revolution to other resistance movements in modern Iranian 
history highlights the importance of its urban nature to its success. Figure 2.3 summarizes each 
of the campaigns discussed. Since 1890, Iran has experienced eleven campaigns that have 
included each of the four combinations of urban or rural and violent or nonviolent. Figure 2.4 
reports failure and success rates for each of these combinations. 
 
These results show that rural resistance campaigns have never been successful in 
Iran’s modern history. They also support the paper’s main argument: that once campaign 
setting is controlled for, campaign resistance tactic cannot predict success. 
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Figure 2.3: Iranian Resistance Campaigns Since 189017 
 
Movement Success/Failure Urban/rural Violent/nonviolent 
    
Tobacco Concession 
Success Urban Nonviolent Protests: 1891-92    
    
Constitutional 
Success Urban Violent Revolution: 1905-11    
    
Kuchek Khan’s 
Failure Rural Violent Revolution: 1918-20    
    
Reza Khan’s Coup: 
Success Urban Violent 1921    
    
Anti-Republican 
Success Urban Nonviolent Demonstrations: 1924    
    
Ayatollah    
Khomeini’s Failed Failure Urban Nonviolent 
Revolution: 1960-64    
    
Revolutionary    
Organization of the 
Failure Rural Violent Tudeh Party of Iran:    
1964-67    
    
The Fedaiyan: 
Failure Urban Violent 1971-79    
    
Islamic Revolution: 
Success Urban Nonviolent 1977-79    
    
The Green 
Failure Urban Nonviolent Movement: 2009-10    
    
Anti-Rouhani 
Failure Rural Nonviolent Protests: 2017-1818 
     
 
 
 
17 Mossadegh’s rise to power, and the coup that removed him from power, are not included in this list nor 
discussed at length in this section. Mossadegh acceded to the position of Prime Minister following free elections, 
not from an extra-legal movement. The coup that removed Mossadegh from power was orchestrated by the United 
States government, not by Iranians. Because this paper is concerned with extra-legal resistance movements, 
Mossadegh’s rise and fall are not included.  
18 The Anti-Rouhani protests are ongoing. As the movement progresses, it may spread to cities or lead to political 
change, though such an outcome seems doubtful at this time. 
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Figure 2.4: Success and Failure Rate by Campaign Type and Setting 
 
 Success Rate Failure Rate 
   
Rural Violent (2 cases) 0% 100% 
   
Rural Nonviolent (1 case) 0% 100% 
   
Urban Violent (3 cases) 67% 33% 
   
Urban Nonviolent (5 cases) 60% 40% 
   
 
 
To be sure, the peaceful components of the Islamic Revolution were instrumental in 
making the movement a success. However, the revolution would likely have faced defeat if it 
had not been able to motivate urban participation, and it is unclear whether the revolution would 
have been successful without the combined use of nonviolent and violent tactics. 
 
Is Iran an “easy case” to use to support this paper’s theory? Keddie argues that Iran is 
uniquely prone to “multi-urban” revolutions (revolutions based in multiple cities) (1991, 73-94). 
She theorizes that multi-urban revolutions might be more difficult for government security forces 
to repress than single city revolutions, as repressive capacity is spread thin as a movement grows. 
Indeed, all eight of the urban campaigns discussed in this section spread to multiple cities. 
 
Why do Iranian revolts tend to be multi-urban? Given the Pahlavis’ often pro-urban (and 
anti-rural) policies, one might expect revolution to be more common in rural areas where 
grievances with the regime are more widespread. Several anthropologists have confirmed that 
Iranian peasants from across the country displayed a docility that betrayed their often deep hatred 
for their landlords and the central regime that supported them (Kazemi and Abrahamian 1978, 
259-260). Kazemi and Abrahamian attribute this lack of revolutionary fervor among Iranian 
peasant populations to a dearth of middle peasantry in the country. Middle peasants, unlike rich 
landlords or poor landless farmers, have “both the ability and the inclination to revolt” (Kazemi 
and Abrahamian 1978, 265). Keddie reasons that Iran’s lack of middle peasantry may stem from 
the country’s aridity, which reduces agricultural productivity. Such a climate leaves most farmers 
poor and spread out, but allows a select few landlords to monopolize irrigation access and 
production (1981, 79). It is no coincidence that the Constitutional Revolution, Kuchek Khan’s 
Revolution, and the Fedaiyan all operated in the fertile region of Gilan (Keddie 1995, 80). 
 
Other characteristics of Iranian geography suggest Iran may be a hard case against which 
to test this paper’s theory. In their classic paper on civil war, Fearon and Laitin find large 
populations and mountainous terrain to be positively correlated to civil war onset, and they find 
a negative correlation between GDP per capita and civil war onset. In Fearon and Laitin’s 
dataset of 161 countries, Iran has the 24th most mountainous terrain (2003, 84). In 1979, Iran 
had the 24th highest population in the world (United Nations 2017), and the 92nd lowest GDP 
per capita (World Bank Data 2018). These indicators suggest that Iran should have been prone to 
the “small, lightly armed bands practicing guerilla warfare from rural base areas” that Fearon 
and Laitin write of (2003, 75). 
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VII. Conclusion 
 
The central conclusion of this paper is that resistance campaign success is determined 
by the setting in which campaigns occur, and not due to the methods that campaigns employ. I 
support this theory using data from more than 1,800 events linked to more than 100 campaigns, 
and a case study of revolutions in modern Iranian history. 
 
I find strong quantitative evidence supporting the hypothesis that nonviolent campaigns 
are more likely to occur in urban areas than rural ones. I also find strong support for the 
hypothesis that urban campaigns are more likely to succeed than rural campaigns. Finally, I find 
mixed results supporting the hypothesis that controlling for campaign setting cancels the effect 
of campaign type on success. I support these findings qualitatively with a case study of Iranian 
resistance movements since 1890. 
 
Future research should examine additional channels of endogeneity. Nonviolent campaigns 
may be more likely to emerge against weak regimes than violent campaigns. One case study of six 
major nonviolent revolutions found that each one was preceded by an economic shock, lending 
plausibility to this theory (Nepstad 2011b, 125). Until nonviolent movements have been more 
closely examined, researchers should be more careful in advocating its practice. 
 
 
Appendix 1: Campaign List 
 
 
 
Year Campaign Country Campaign Campaign Number 
   Urbanness Violence of Linked 
   (% of (% of Events 
   linked linked  
   events that events that  
   are urban) are  
    violent)  
      
1948 National Union Party Costa Rica 0 0 2 
      
1952 Karens Myanmar 1 0.167 12 
      
1953 South Africa First South Africa 0 0 3 
 Defiance Campaign     
      
1953 Darul Islam Indonesia 1 0 3 
      
1954 Hukbalahap Philippines 1 0.167 12 
 Rebellion     
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1954 Tunisian Tunisia 0.75 0 4 
 independence     
 movement     
      
1954 Indochina revolt Vietnam, 0.947 0.228 57 
  Democratic    
      
1956 Mau Mau Rebellion Kenya 0.9 0 20 
      
1956 Hungary Hungary 0.5 0.5 2 
 Anti-Communist     
      
1957 Malayan Emergency Malaysia 0.917 0.083 12 
      
1959 Tibetan resistance China 0.5 0 2 
      
1959 Naga Rebellion India 1 0 5 
      
1959 Ethniki Organosis Cyprus 0.727 0.091 11 
 Kyprios Agoniston     
      
1962 Armed Forces for Venezuela 1 0 1 
 National Liberation     
 (FALN)     
      
1962 Pro-French France 1 0 1 
 Nationalists     
      
1962 Katanga-led leftists Zaire 1 0 1 
      
1963 Zambia Zambia 1 0 2 
 Anti-occupation     
      
1965 Dominican leftists Dominican 0 0 2 
  Republic    
      
1966 Cultural Revolution China 0.556 0.444 9 
 Red Guards     
      
1967 Biafrans Nigeria 1 0 2 
      
1967 Naxalite rebellion India 1 0 1 
      
1967 Royalists Yemen 1 0 1 
      
1967 FLOSY, NLF in Yemen 1 0 2 
 Aden     
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1968 North Vietnam Vietnam, 0.935 0 164 
 (National Liberation Democratic    
 Front)     
      
1970 Palestinian activists Jordan 0.96 0.28 25 
      
1970 Kurdish rebellion Iraq 0.875 0 16 
      
1971 JVP Sri Lanka 1 0 1 
      
1971 Tupamaros Uruguay 1 0 11 
      
1971 Bengalis Pakistan 0.5 0 2 
      
1972 Anya Nya Sudan 0.5 0 2 
      
1973 First Hutu Rebellion Burundi 0.667 0 12 
      
1974 Front for the Mozambique 1 0.5 2 
 Liberation of     
 Mozambique     
      
1975 Lebanon leftists Lebanon 0.75 0.5 4 
      
1975 Khmer Rouge Cambodia 0.926 0.037 27 
      
1975 Pathet Lao Laos 0.957 0.217 23 
      
1976 ERP/ Monteneros Argentina 1 0 3 
      
1977 Thai communist Thailand 0.9 0 10 
 rebels     
      
1977 ETA Spain 0.982 0.255 110 
      
1977 Moro National Philippines 1 0 9 
 Liberation Front     
      
1978 FLNC Zaire 1 0 1 
      
1978 UNITA Angola 1 0.125 9 
      
1978 Western Sahara Western Sahara 1 0 3 
 Freedom Movement     
 (POLISARIO)     
      
1979 Zimbabwe African Zimbabwe 0.9 0.2 10 
 People's Union     
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1979 FSLN Nicaragua 0.833 0 6 
      
1979 Anti-Khmer Rouge Cambodia 1 0 1 
      
1980 Somali rebels Ethiopia 1 0 2 
 (Ogaden)     
      
1982 Muslim Brotherhood Syria 1 0.333 6 
      
1983 LTTE Sri Lanka 0.97 0.09 134 
      
1984 Renamo Mozambique 1 0 6 
      
1985 Sikh insurgency India 0.814 0.069 102 
      
1985 Hizballah Lebanon 0.902 0.471 51 
      
1986 New People's Army Philippines 1 0 25 
      
1986 Mizo Revolt India 0.714 0 14 
      
1986 National Resistance Uganda 1 0.8 5 
 Army     
      
1986 People Power Philippines 0 1 1 
      
1987 PF-ZAPU guerillas Zimbabwe 0.66667 0.33333 6 
      
1988 Second Hutu Burundi 1 0 1 
 Rebellion     
      
1988 SWAPO Namibia 0.5 0.25 4 
      
1989 Bulgaria Bulgaria 0 1 1 
 Anti-Communist     
      
1989 Solidarity Poland 0.024 0.19 42 
      
1990 Mongolian Mongolia 0 0 1 
 Anti-communist     
      
1990 Contras Nicaragua 1 0 16 
      
1991 Shiite rebellion Iraq 1 0 3 
      
1991 Albania Albania 0 0 2 
 Anti-Communist     
      
1991 Eritrean-led rebels Ethiopia 0.75 0 4 
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1991 Tigrean People's Ethiopia 1 0 1 
 Liberation Front     
      
1991 Somalia clan Somalia 0.375 0.625 5 
 factions; SNM     
      
1991 Anti-Arap Moi Kenya 0.111 0.889 9 
      
1991 Zambia Anti-Single Zambia 0.33 1 3 
 Party     
      
1992 Armenians in Azerbaijan 1 0 3 
 Nagorno-Karabakh     
      
1992 Kurdish Secession Iraq 0.588 0 17 
 against Sadam     
      
1992 Revolutionary Colombia 0.877 0 73 
 Armed Forces of     
 Colombia and     
 National Liberation     
 Army     
      
1993 Sendero Luminoso Peru 1 0 46 
 (The Shining Path)     
 Senderista     
 Insurgency     
      
1993 Gamsakhurdia & Georgia 1 0 6 
 Abkhazia     
      
1993 Ogoni movement Nigeria 1 0 1 
      
1993 Tauregs Mali 1 0 6 
      
1993 Third Hutu Rebellion Burundi 0.909 0.5 23 
      
1993 Anti-Banda Malawi 0 1 11 
      
1994 Mohajir Pakistan 0.875 0 8 
      
1994 Tutsi rebels Rwanda 1 0 2 
      
1994 South Africa Second South Africa 0.564 0.426 127 
 Defiance Campaign     
      
1994 Patriotic Front Rwanda 1 1 1 
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1995 Serb militias Bosnia-Herzeg 0.833 0.278 54 
  ovina    
      
1995 NPFL & ULIMO Liberia 1 0 3 
      
1996 KDP Kurds Iraq 0.4 0 5 
      
1996 Chechen separatists Russia 0.967 0 90 
      
1997 Tupac Amaru Peru 1 0 19 
 Revolutionary     
 Movement (MRTA)     
 - Senderista     
 Insurgency     
      
1997 Kabila-ADFL Democratic 0 1 1 
  Republic of the    
  Congo    
      
2000 Kifaya Egypt 0 1 4 
      
2000 IRA Ireland 0.719 0.156 32 
      
2000 Anti-Rawlings Ghana 0.2 0.8 5 
      
2001 GAM Indonesia 1 0 4 
      
2001 Anti-Chiluba Zambia 0.5 0.5 2 
      
2002 LRA Uganda 0.75 0 4 
      
2003 Kashmiri Muslim India 0.885 0.098 61 
 separatists     
      
2003 LURD Liberia 0.9 0 10 
      
2005 Islamic Salvation Algeria 0 1 3 
 Front     
      
2005 PMIC Cote d'Ivoire 1 0 2 
      
2005 SPLA-Garang Sudan 
0.5 
0.5 4 
 faction         
      
2006 Taliban Resistance Afghanistan 0.966 0.068 59 
      
2006 Iraqi insurgency Iraq 0.722 0.194 36 
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2006 CPN-M/UPF Nepal 0.842 0.105 19 
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